Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua). Compensation Owed by the Republic of Nicaragua to the Republic of Costa Rica by Rudall, J.T.P.
ultimately assuming “the internal point of view”15 more critically. In particular, the inquiry
has aimed to understand the debate on the right to abort as men and, especially, women in
Chile would, in light of their own reality and upon a look around the world. To this end, it has
closely tracked and scrutinized the Chilean justices’ disquisitions—which draw on those of
the parties, the political establishment, and civil society—on the underlying questions as
debated at home and abroad. Hopefully, the analysis undertaken will engender more dialogue
in Chile and elsewhere and help open a window from which to view as vividly as possible the
road behind and ahead.
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Should trees have standing?1 The decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ or
Court) in itsQuestion of Compensation (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) case of February 2, 2018 pro-
vides a pioneering example of damage to the environment being litigated before an interna-
tional tribunal.2 The judgment is the ﬁrst time that the ICJ has adjudicated compensation for
environmental damage, and it is only the third time the ICJ has awarded compensation at all.3
Nevertheless, the ICJ boldly asserted in this case that “damage to the environment, and the
consequent impairment or loss of the ability of the environment to provide goods and services,
is compensable under international law” (para. 42). That said, the reasoning employed by
the Court leaves much to be desired. Given the increasing number of cases involving the
environment, it is unfortunate that international courts and tribunals will garner only limited
guidance from the methodology adopted by the ICJ in valuing environmental damage.
As for the background to this judgment, Costa Rica instituted proceedings against
Nicaragua in 2010, alleging incursion, occupation, and use of its territory by Nicaragua, as
15 HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 199 (1984) (“Those who accept the authority of a
legal system look upon it from the internal point of view, and express their sense of its requirements in internal
statements couched in the normative language which is common to both law and morals. . . .”).
1 See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? LAW, MORALITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (3d ed.
2010).
2 Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Compensation Owed
by the Republic of Nicaragua to the Republic of Costa Rica, General List No. 150, at para. 42 (Int’l Ct. Just. Feb.
2, 2018) (hereinafter Question of Compensation).
3 The other two cases are: Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 ICJ Rep. 4 (Apr. 9); Ahmadou Sadio
Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Compensation, Judgment, 2012 ICJ Rep. 324 (June 19).
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well as breaches by Nicaragua of treaty obligations owed to Costa Rica. After joining these
proceedings with those in the Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River
(Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), concerning transboundary harm caused by Costa Rica, the Court
handed down its judgment on the merits on December 16, 2015.4
In the joined cases, the Court found that Costa Rica had sovereignty over the disputed
territory and that Nicaragua must compensate Costa Rica for material damage to the envi-
ronment resulting from its unlawful activities on the territory. If the parties could not agree on
the amount of compensation within twelve months of the judgment, compensation would be
settled by the Court.5 The parties could not reach an agreement and Costa Rica asked the ICJ
to resolve the issue.
In their respective pleadings, the parties put forward very different methodologies for cal-
culating the environmental damage in monetary terms. Costa Rica suggested an “ecosystem
services approach,” while Nicaragua suggested a “replacement costs approach.” As a result of
these differing methodologies, the parties came to signiﬁcantly different conclusions as to the
amount of compensation owed. Costa Rica estimated that environmental damages amounted
to approximately $6.711 million. Nicaragua arrived at an amount of $188,504.
According to Costa Rica’s “ecosystem services approach” the environment is valued by ref-
erence to the goods and services that comprise it. Some goods and services may be traded on
the market and have a “direct use value” (e.g., timber) while other goods and services cannot
be traded on the market and have an “indirect use value” (e.g., ﬂood prevention). This
approach, Costa Rica claimed, reﬂected the full extent of environmental damage and
found support in international and domestic practice.
Under Nicaragua’s “replacement costs approach,” the cost of preserving an equivalent area
while the affected area recovers is the value to be used to calculate the compensation owed.
Nicaragua argued that its approach tracked the method used most frequently by the United
Nations Compensation Commission for valuing environmental damage in the ﬁrst GulfWar.
After considering the suggested approaches of the parties, the Court made a general point
of principle: it is consistent with international law, especially in light of the need to ensure full
reparation, to order compensation for damage to the environment. For the Court, interna-
tional law permits compensation for both environmental damage and for the costs and
expenses incurred by Costa Rica arising fromNicaragua’s unlawful activities (e.g., monitoring
and restoration of the damaged environment). While the approaches put forward by both
parties had precedents, the Court noted that there was also precedent for other methods of
calculating compensation. As a result, the Court reasoned that it would not choose between
the twomethodologies set out by the parties, but rather “[w]herever certain elements of either
method offer a reasonable basis for valuation, the Court [would] nonetheless take them into
account” (para. 52).
Ultimately, the Court decided to value environmental damage based on what it called an
“overall valuation approach.”Using this approach, compensation is calculated based on an over-
all evaluation of the impairment or loss of environmental goods and services, rather than by
calculating the value of speciﬁc categories of environmental goods and services as well as the
4 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) and Construction of a
Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), Judgment, 2015 ICJ Rep. 665 (Dec. 16).
5 Id., para. 142.
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time itmay take each to recover. TheCourt applied thismethodology to the claim for damage to
the environment. It would apply a differentmethodology later in its judgment to calculate com-
pensation for the costs incurred by Costa Rica resulting from Nicaragua’s unlawful activities,
which included the cost of monitoring and repairing the environmental damage.
The Court’s stated reasons for choosing the “overall valuation” methodology are worth
noting. First, it was keen to adopt an approach that accounted for the correlation between
the activities of Nicaragua and the harm caused to certain environmental goods and services.
Second, it considered its approach more appropriate than others in light of the speciﬁc char-
acteristics of the area affected, namely a protected wetland under the Ramsar Convention
with closely interlinked environmental goods and services. Third, an overall valuation allowed
the Court to take into account the capacity of the damaged area for natural regeneration. The
Court also referred to the Chorzów formula that “the breach of an engagement involves an
obligation to make reparation in an adequate form” and, accordingly, an injured party should
be repaired in such a way that they are put back in the same position as if the illegal act had not
occurred.6However, the Court is not clear on why the “overall valuation”methodology serves
these aims better than the other methodologies considered. We can only assume the Court
deemed those other methodologies to be either over- or under-inclusive.
A close reading of the judgment suggests that the Court’s “overall valuation” was inﬂu-
enced by an alternative valuation offered by Nicaragua in its pleadings, the so-called “cor-
rected analysis.” The “corrected analysis” applies Costa Rica’s ecosystem services approach
but with signiﬁcant adjustments to the categories of environmental goods and services
included and the values used. Despite critiquing this “corrected analysis” in paragraph 85
of its judgment, the Court seemingly goes on to apply a variation of the “corrected analysis”
for the purpose of arriving at its overall valuation in paragraph 86. While noting that the
absence of certainty should not preclude it from awarding an amount approximately reﬂect-
ing the environmental damage caused, the Court considered that, “for the purposes of its
overall valuation, an adjustment be made to the total amount in the ‘corrected analysis’ to
account for the shortcomings . . .” (para. 86).
As a way of justifying the potential uncertainties in the valuation of environmental damage,
the Court referred to Diallo, a case in which “equitable considerations” were drawn upon to
determine the amount of compensation.7 This also allowed the Court room to take into
account the particular contexts in which the parties found themselves. Moreover, it cited
the Trail Smelter case,8 which in turn refers to a U.S. Supreme Court decision9 stating
that, “[w]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount
of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to
deny all relief to the injured person” and that, as such, “it will be enough if the evidence
show the extent of damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result
be only approximate” (para. 35).10
6 Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment, 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July 27) [hereinafter Factory at
Chorzów Jurisdiction]; Factory at Chorzów,Merits, 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 9, at 47 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter Factory
at Chorzów Merits].
7 Diallo, supra note 3, at 337, para 33.
8 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 UN Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905, 1920 (Arb. Trib. 1941).
9 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
10 Quoting Trail Smelter, supra note 8, and Story Parchment, supra note 9.
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Before actually calculating the compensation owed, the Court sought to appraise the exis-
tence and extent of the damage as well as establish whether there existed a direct and certain
causal link between the environmental harm and Nicaragua’s wrongful acts. Similarly, in the
latter part of the judgment assessing the costs and expenses that Costa Rica claimed it incurred
from its restoration and monitoring activities, the Court placed an emphasis on the existence
of a direct connection with the wrongful actions of Nicaragua. Where a link between the
incurred cost and the wrongful act was lacking, the Court rejected compensation for the
cost (e.g., aircraft insurance or the regular wages of government employees).
Lastly, the Court considered whether pre- and post-judgment interest could be applied to
the principal amount of compensation, as argued by Costa Rica. The Court concluded that
interest was payable at a rate of 4 percent per annum in the pre-judgment period and at a rate
of 6 percent per annum in the post-judgment period should Nicaragua fail to pay the com-
pensation due by April 2018.
The Court ﬁnally awarded total compensation in the amount of $378,890.59, including
pre-judgment interest. OnMarch 8, 2018, Nicaragua paid the total amount of compensation
to Costa Rica.
* * * *
The Court’s judgment is innovative in its award of compensation for environmental dam-
age. The decision is also notable for its bold statements of principle, opaque methodological
choices, some internal contradiction, and for awarding much lower valuations for environ-
mental damage than the claimant had argued. Indeed, the amount awarded represented
around 5 percent of the claim made by Costa Rica. Without a more detailed account of its
environmental damage valuation methodology as well as the application of its nexus test to
incurred costs and expenses, it is difﬁcult to appraise whether the Court was justiﬁed in
awarding this lower amount. Several aspects of the judgment can, however, be analyzed
more deeply.
First, the Court boldly conﬁrms that damage to the environment itself is compensable
under international law. For the Court, environmental damage includes the inability of
the environment to provide goods and services. This is distinct from the expenses incurred
by a state as a result of such damage, which can also be compensable and include remediation
and monitoring costs. In addition to its bold afﬁrmation, the ICJ’s judgment clariﬁes several
concrete matters related to the calculation of compensation. For example, the ICJ is open to
compensating the wages of ofﬁcials dealing with the consequences of the wrongful acts of
another state where these wages are beyond those budgeted in the ordinary course of events.
The ICJ stated that this was “in line with international practice” and cited a United Nations
Compensation Commission report (para. 101). In this way, it would appear that the Court
made a distinction between variable and ﬁxed costs in certain aspects of its valuation
methodology.
Second, the opinion involves some opaque methodology. On the issue of interest, the
Court stated that “pre-judgment interest may be awarded if full reparation for injury caused
by an internationally wrongful act so requires” (para. 151). That said, the Court tempered this
statement by observing that “interest is not an autonomous form of reparation, nor is it a
necessary part of compensation in every case” (id.). The Court then made a curious distinc-
tion in awarding pre-judgment interest on the compensation for Costa Rica’s restoration and
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monitoring costs but not on the compensation for environmental damage. On this issue, the
Court noted it had “taken full account of the impairment or loss of environmental goods and
services in the period prior to recovery” and, as such, did not need to apply pre-judgment
interest to the compensation for environmental damage (para. 152). However, the Court
said post-judgment interest would apply on both environmental damage and costs and
expenses incurred by Costa Rica if Nicaragua did not pay the compensation ordered within
the time limit it stipulated. To support this conclusion, the Court simply referred to Diallo,
which reasoned that “the award of post-judgment interest is consistent with the practice of
other international courts and tribunals.”11 The ICJ saw no reason to deviate from this
approach in the present case (para. 154). The method by which the Court arrived at its inter-
est calculations is, however, as opaque as its method for calculating the principal sum of com-
pensation owed.
Indeed, it is far from clear how an international tribunal might calculate environmental
damage in future cases based on this decision by the ICJ. While it seems appropriate to
adopt a ﬂexible approach to the calculation of compensation, leaving room to tailor a meth-
odology to the circumstances of a given case, the Court unfortunately does not adequately
explain the particulars of the methodology it used. This opacity makes it very difﬁcult to crit-
ically assess the application of the methodology adopted by the Court, and it provides no
authoritative touchstone for other international courts or tribunals dealing with similar issues.
Despite the lack of clarity, a number of critical observations can nevertheless be made. For
example, the Court does not explore any baseline environmental assessment prior to
Nicaragua causing the damage. This omission comes into particularly sharp focus when
one recalls the emphasis the ICJ placed on applying the Chorzów formula,12 which aims to
put the injured party back in the position it was before the wrongful act took place. The Court
also does not give a recovery period estimate or explicitly factor in the cost of mitigation or
remediation measures during that recovery period. The categories of environmental goods
and services are each very different from one another and should have prompted different
methodologies for calculating damage to them. Here, the Court could have referred to
other national and international cases which distinguish between different categories of envi-
ronmental damage, such as cleanup operations performed by public employees, the use of
public buildings for the conduct of cleanup operations, restoration activities, and the environ-
mental damage caused.13
Third, there is some level of contradiction in the Court’s judgment. Initially, it gives the
impression it wants to apply a methodically clinical valuation approach. For instance, the ICJ
emphasized the establishment of a direct and clear nexus between Nicaragua’s activities and
the environmental damage. Moreover, the judgment suggests that, as a ﬁrst step, the Court is
at pains to assess the existence and extent of the damage prior to calculating the monetary
value of that damage. Further still, the Court initially develops an itemized list of what it
deems reasonably appropriate to claim for compensation and critiques certain aspects of
the detailed methodologies set out by the parties. All of this implied that the Court would
11 Diallo, supra note 3, at 343, para. 56.
12 Factory at Chorzów Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 21; Factory at Chorzów Merits, supra note 6, at 47.
13 See, e.g., In theMatter of Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France onMarch 16, 1978, 954 F.2d
1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
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ultimately provide a detailed explanation of its favored valuation methodology. Instead, how-
ever, the Court simply embraces a less than clinical “overall valuation” approach. In doing so,
it neither refers to previous practice nor elaborates upon the details of the approach, except to
say that it “can account for the correlation between the removal of the trees and the harm
caused to other environmental goods and services,” that it “is dictated by the speciﬁc charac-
teristics of the area affected by the activities ofNicaragua,” and that it “take[s] into account the
capacity of the damaged area for natural regeneration” (paras. 79–81). Exactly how and why
the overall valuation approach achieves these ends remain a mystery.
The ICJ also failed to learn from previous litigation on environmental matters. For exam-
ple, why did the Court not consult experts when assessing the environmental damage? It has
this option open to it under Article 50 of the Statute of the ICJ. In fact, in a judgment handed
down on the same day as the present case—Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and
the Paciﬁc Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)14—the Court had appointed its own experts. The
resort to experts in scientiﬁc matters has also been encouraged by the ICJ in the past, partic-
ularly in the Pulp Mills case.15 Moreover, in their Dissenting Opinion in that case, Judges
Simma and Al-Khasawneh stressed the importance of referring to experts in cases involving
complex scientiﬁc issues.16 Finally, although this case is only the third in which the ICJ has
awarded interstate compensation, in both of the prior decisions it appointed its own experts to
assess the compensation amount.17
To take another example, investment tribunals have had recourse to experts in the face of
complex counterclaims for environmental damage. In a 2015 ICSID dispute, Perenco
v. Ecuador,18 the respondent argued that the claimant had caused environmental damage
in the amount of $3 billion. Recognizing the difﬁculty in appraising the value of such damage
and criticizing the testimony of the parties’ experts, the Tribunal in that case appointed its
own independent environmental expert to assist with the task.19
In a further example, Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, an ICSID tribunal ordered the
payment of $41million in compensation for environmental damage caused.20 It did so on the
basis of Ecuadorian national law but the methodology adopted by the Tribunal is, neverthe-
less, of note. In particular, the Tribunal assessed the harm caused and reparation cost at each
of the forty sites in the oil ﬁeld exploited by the claimant and even made site visits.
In the ﬁnal analysis, these recent cases and others evidence a trend toward the environment
becoming a more regular feature of international adjudication.21 Despite the ﬂaws in the
14Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Paciﬁc Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicar.); Land Boundary in
the Northern Part of Isla Portillos (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), General List Nos. 157 & 165 (Int’l Ct. Just. Feb. 2,
2018).
15 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 ICJ Rep. 14, 36, para. 167 (Apr. 20).
16 Id., Dissenting Opinion of Judges Simma and Al-Khasawneh, at paras. 3, 8.
17 Corfu Channel, supra note 3, at 4; Diallo, supra note 3, at 324.
18 Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Eduador
(Petroecuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Interim Decision on the Environmental Counterclaim (Aug. 11,
2015).
19 Id., para. 587.
20 Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5.
21 See, e.g., id; Perenco v. Ecuador, supra note 18; The Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in
Relation to the Environment in the Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal
Integrity – Interpretation and Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23 (Nov. 15, 2017); Dispute Concerning
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judgment of the ICJ in the Question of Compensation case, it is signiﬁcant that the Court
found environmental damage itself to be compensable, at least in the form of goods and ser-
vices provided by the environment. The Court did not take a direct step toward “standing” for
trees because it awarded compensation for damage to Costa Rica but it did perhaps take an
indirect step by ﬁnding damage to the environment itself requires compensation, beyond just
the costs of environmental remediation andmonitoring. In the present hostile climate around
matters of the environment, this and other recent cases show that “oaks may still grow strong
in contrary winds.”22
JASON RUDALL
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Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cote
d’Ivoire), ITLOS Case No. 23 (Sept. 23, 2017). For a fuller exploration of trends and prospects in the extension of
environmental protection through litigation, see Jason Rudall, Altruism in International Law (2017) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) (on ﬁle with author).
22 An adaptation of the PeterMarshall quotation: “When we long for life without difﬁculty, remind us that oaks
grow strong under contrary winds and diamonds are made under pressure,” available at https://www.goodreads.
com/author/quotes/33254.Peter_Marshall.
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